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Article 6

Begier v. IRS: Tracing Trust
Fund Taxes in Bankruptcy
l.

INTRODUCTION

Transfers of a debtor's property to a creditor made ninety days
prior to filing a bankruptcy petition are, in most instances, voidable by
the bankruptcy trustee. 1 However, if the debtor transfers assets which
are not her own, the trustee cannot vacate the transfer. More specifically, property a debtor holds in trust for another entity is not property
of the debtor and is therefore excepted from the trustee's avoidance
powers. 2
The Internal Revenue Code provides that employers and other
persons who withhold or collect income taxes, FICA payments, excise
taxes, and other similar monies, hold such funds in trust for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 3 Therefore, transfers of these trust fund
taxes to the IRS during the ninety-day period preceding bankruptcy
normally should not be voidable by the trustee because they are not
transfers of the debtor's property. However, if the debtor commingles
trust fund assets with her personal funds and the assets cease to be
identifiable, or if the debtor disposes of trust fund assets in whole or
part, the common law of trusts may view a pre-petition transfer to the
IRS as voidable because it consists not of trust fund assets, but of the
debtor's property.•
1. II U.S.C. § 547(b) (1990).
2. See, e.g., II U.S.C. § 541 (d) (1990); Research Planning, Inc. v. Segal (In re First Capital
Mortgage Loan Corp.), 917 F.2d 424, 426 (lOth Cir. 1990) (by definition, property held by the
debtor in trust is not part of the bankruptcy estate); Sanyo Elec., Inc. v. Howard's Appliance
Corp. (In re Howard's Appliance Corp.), 874 F.2d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting United States
v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 205 n.10 (1983) ("Congress plainly excluded property of
others held by the debtor in trust at the time of the filing of the petition.")); Turley v. Mahan &
Rowsey, Inc. (In re Mahan & Rowsey, Inc.), 817 F.2d 682, 684 (lOth Cir. 1987) (money held
under a trust arising from non-bankruptcy law is not property of the estate by definition); 4
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1J 541.13 (15th ed. 1990).
3. 26 U.S.C. § 7501 (a) (1990) ("Whenever any person is required to collect or withhold any
internal revenue tax from any other person . . . the amount of tax so collected or withheld shall
be held to be a special fund in trust for the United States.").
4. E.g., Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Universal Ins. Co., 838 F.2d 612, 618 (1st Cir.
1988) (claimant must identify the trust fund or property and, where the trust fund has been
commingled with general property of the debtor, sufficiently trace the property or funds); American Serv. Co. v. Henderson, 120 F.2d 525,530-31 (4th Cir. 1941) (claimant to a trust fund which
has been mingled with the general property of the debtor must sufficiently trace the trust property); In re Auto-Train Corp., 53 Bankr. 990, 997 (Bankr. D.C. 1985) (requiring trust fund
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However, as will be demonstrated in this casenote, the common
law of trusts may not always control transactions in bankruptcy. In
particular, this note looks at how the common law of trusts has been
modified by the recent decision in Begier v. IRS.~'> It examines the history of trust fund tracing in bankruptcy prior to Begier, analyzes the
reasons for adopting Begier's approach, and summarizes the potential
impacts of implementing the apparent result in Begier.
II.

BACKGROUND

As the result of the 1971 Supreme Court case of United States v.
Randall,6 courts began to require the IRS to strictly trace all trust
fund assets if it wished to recover such monies outside of normal bankruptcy distribution channels. Randall involved a debtor who retained
possession of withheld taxes after filing a petition in bankruptcy. The
IRS sought to recover these taxes, arguing that the funds were property
of the IRS and not property of the debtor. Because the monies were
commingled with the debtor's other assets, and the IRS could not trace
the origin of the funds to the withheld taxes, the Court refused to allow
the IRS to recover the funds. After Randall, lower courts began to
impose strict tracing requirements on the IRS if it sought to collect
withheld taxes from the debtor without standing in line behind bankruptcy administrative expenses and other creditors with higher priority.
Perhaps to mitigate the effect of commingling and to ameliorate
the IRS's burden in bankruptcy, Congress gave the IRS power to require debtors to establish separate bank accounts for the deposit of trust
fund money. 7 Additionally, when the new Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978, statements made on the floor of the House and Senate
indicated that the IRS should not be subject to the strict trust tracing
requirements set forth in Randall. 6 Instead, courts could use "reasonaproperty tracing using lowest intermediate balance test); 4 CoLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ~ 541.13
(15th ed. 1990) (where the fund or property has been mingled in the general property of the
debtor, the claimant must sufficiently trace the property).
5. 110 S. Ct. 2258 (1990).
6. 401 u.s. 513 (1971).
7. 26 U.S.C. § 7512 (1990) (implementation of this section is in the IRS's discretion and
only if tax payment has not been timely).
8. See 124 CoNG. REC. H32,417 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
Representative Don Edwards (D-Cal.) stated, in relevant part:
[A] serious problem exists where "trust fund taxes" withheld from others are held to be
property of the estate where the withheld amounts are commingled with other assets of
the debtor. The courts should permit the use of reasonable assumptions under which
the Internal Revenue Service . . . can demonstrate that amounts of withheld taxes are
still in the possession of the debtor at the commencement of the case. For example,
where the debtor had commingled that amount of withheld taxes in his general check-
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ble assumptions" regarding the disposition of trust fund taxes to permit
the IRS to recover ahead of administrative expenses. 9
Since 1978, courts have been increasingly uncertain as to the extent to which Randall's strict tracing requirements were modified by
the new Bankruptcy Code. Some cases have held that the IRS must still
trace, to some extent, the source of pre-petition payments to the IRS
during the ninety-day preference period. 10 Other courts have held that
the mere fact that payment is made means that the "reasonable assumptions" test is met, and no further tracing is necessary to permit the
IRS to retain pre-petition payments made during the preference
period. 11
In Razorback Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. United States, 12 an Arkansas bankruptcy court held that the "reasonable assumptions" test
means that any money paid to the IRS during the ninety-day pre-petition period would be classified as trust fund taxes, despite the fact that
it was commingled with the debtor's assets and the IRS did not trace
the trust fund monies. Payment alone was sufficient to identify the
assets.
However, in Drabkin v. District of Columbia/ 3 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia determined that "reasonable assumptions" means that mere payment is not enough to identify assets to the
trust. Rather, the IRS must still trace the disposition of trust fund
taxes.
Neither of these cases, though, had fact patterns that exactly correing account, it might be reasonable to assume that any remaining amounts in that
account on the commencement of the case are the withheld taxes.
ld. See also 124 CoNG. REc. S34,017 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1978) (Senator Dennis DeConcini (DAriz.) repeated the statement of Representative Don Edwards (D-Cal.) in the Senate one week
later).
9. See sources cited supra note 8; see also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong, 1st Sess. 373,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CoNe. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 6329 (stating that "[a] payment of
withholding taxes constitutes a payment of money held in trust under Internal Revenue Code §
7501 (a), and thus will not be a preference . . . . ").
10. E.g., Drabkin v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1102, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (the fact of
payment, without more, does not create a trust for purposes of the Code); Graham v. United
States (In re Malmart Mortgage Co.), 109 Bankr. 1, 4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (funds paid prepetition must be traced to withheld taxes); Ginsberg v. Washington (In re Olympic Foundry Co.),
63 Bankr. 324, 327-28 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 71 Bankr. 216
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987) (pre-petition payment of state taxes, analogous to federal withholding
taxes, were recovered as a preference because no trust account was established and trust funds
were not segregated).
11. E.g., Pereira v. United States (In re Rodriguez), 50 Bankr. 576 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1985); Razorback Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. United States (In re Razorback Ready-Mix Concrete Co.), 45 Bankr. 917 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1984).
12. 45 Bankr. 917 (E.D. Ark. 1984).
13. 824 F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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sponded to Randall. In Randall, the IRS was trying to collect trust
fund taxes that were never paid. In Drabkin, the trust fund taxes were
paid involuntarily and the bankruptcy trustee was trying to recover
funds from the IRS. In Razorback, the taxpayer had voluntarily paid
trust fund taxes which the bankruptcy trustee was trying to recover.
Consequently, there was substantial confusion over whether the voluntary nature of pre-petition payments was important to the decisions.
Also, there was uncertainty whether payment or lack thereof should be
a determining factor in deciding what the burden on the IRS or the
trustee should be. Since Regier involved a voluntary pre-petition payment, its holding may be limited to other similar situations. However,
as will be discussed later, the language of the Regier decision is so
broad that it may be applied in future IRS trust fund tax cases, regardless of either the voluntary nature of payment or the lack of payment
altogether.

III.
A.

Regier v. IRS

Facts

American International Airways (AlA) was having trouble meeting its FICA, excise, and income tax withholding payments to the IRS.
Consequently, the IRS required AlA to establish a section 7512 account14 to deposit future tax payments. AlA established the account but
neglected to deposit all payments as required. However, AlA did begin
to make timely tax payments. The payments were made both from
AlA's general corporate bank accounts and from the trust account. 15
Some time later, AlA filed bankruptcy. The bankruptcy trustee, Harry
P. Begier, Jr., tried to set aside payments made to the IRS during the
ninety-day pre-petition period.

B.

Court Decisions

The bankruptcy court held that the trustee could avoid payments
made from the general corporate accounts, but that payments from the
trust account were held in trust for the IRS and were not "property of
the debtor" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. 16 The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuitl 7 and, ultimately, the Supreme
14.
15.
16.
1988).
17.

26 U.S.C. § 7512 (1990); see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
Begier v. IRS, 110 S. Ct. 2258, 2261 (1990).
Begier v. IRS (In re American lnt'l Airways, Inc.), 83 Bankr. 324 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
Begier v. IRS, 878 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1989).
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Court 18 reversed the bankruptcy court, holding that all amounts paid to
the IRS were held in trust by AlA and were not "property of the
debtor." 19
IV.

How Begier MoDIFIES THE IRS's TRACING BuRDEN

A. The Circumstance in Which the Tracing Burden Is Clearly Established-The Case of Voluntary Transfer
The Supreme Court's decision in Begier requires that there be
some nexus between the money that the IRS claims for trust fund taxes
and the actual taxes that the debtor withholds. The Court definitively
finds a sufficient connection to exist when money is voluntarily transferred pre-petition to the IRS. 20 Therefore, if the IRS can establish
that the debtor voluntarily transferred money at any time prior to
bankruptcy, the IRS will be entitled to keep such funds.

B. Circumstances in Which the Tracing
clear-Involuntary Transfer or Non-Payment

Burden

Is

Un-

Unfortunately, if limited to its facts alone, Begier does not give
clear guidance as to what other connections, besides voluntary payment
by the debtor, are sufficient to allow the IRS to exclude assets from the
bankruptcy estate. If the debtor never makes a pre-petition transfer of
trust fund monies, as was the case in Randall, what is the tracing
burden on the IRS? Must the IRS revert to strict tracing, as in Randall, or is it now permitted to recover the money, even if no transfer is
ever made and without further tracing? Also, Begier, on its facts, does
not directly address the issue of whether involuntary payments are to
be treated the same as voluntary payments. Therefore, an important
question in the Begier decision is its implication for future cases with
somewhat dissimilar facts.

1.

Strict tracing rule of Randall overturned

The Supreme Court stated in Begier that "[t]he strict [tracing] rule
of Randall . . . did not survive the adoption of the new bankruptcy
code." 21 By this statement the Court appears to rule out the possibility
that courts in future cases, where no money is transferred, will apply
18. Begier v. IRS, 110 S. Ct. 2258 (1990).
19. !d. at 2260; Begier v. IRS, 878 F.2d 762, 771 (3d Cir. 1989).
20. Begier v. IRS, 110 S. Ct. at 2267 ("[T]he House Report identifies one such [reasonable]
assumption to be that any voluntary pre-petition payment of trust-fund taxes out of the debtor's
assets is not a transfer of the debtor's property.").
21. /d. at 2266.
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the strict tracing requirements of Randall. However, the Court also
seems to support the idea that some burden must be placed on the IRS
to " 'demonstrate that amounts of withheld taxes are still in the possession of the debtor at the commencement of the case.' " 22 The Court
asserts that "Congress expected that the IRS would have to show some
connection between the section 7501 trust and the assets sought to be
applied to a debtor's trust-fund tax obligations." 23 While the implication of these statements is not clear, it is clear that the strict tracing
requirements of Randall were overturned by the enactment of the new
Bankruptcy Code.

2.

The rule to replace Randall

If Randall's tracing requirements have been overturned by Begier,
what then is the appropriate tracing burden the IRS must meet in cases
where no pre-petition payments are made or are made involuntarily?
The concurring opinion in Begier offers at least some guidance in answering this question. Justice Scalia suggests that, at a minimum, the
taxpayer must have enough assets in her possession at the time of filing
to be able to pay the amount due the IRS. 24 If she does not, it would be
impossible to show any connection between the section 7501 trust and
the assets which either are non-existent at the time of filing or never
existed at all. 211 Therefore, one possible limitation to the IRS's right to
collect trust fund taxes outside normal bankruptcy distribution channels
might be the fact that the debtor does not have sufficient assets even to
pay her trust fund taxes.
However, such a limitation does not seem to be much of a burden
on the IRS. If the IRS is allowed to recover trust fund taxes in all
circumstances, except where the debtor does not have sufficient assets to
pay the taxes, in essence, the IRS will always be entitled to collect trust
fund taxes ahead of bankruptcy administrative expenses and other
higher priority creditors.
The language used by the majority, though, seems to support this
notion of bankruptcy side-stepping for the IRS. Such a conclusion can
be derived from a careful reading of the Court's interpretation of the
function and scope of a section 7501 trust. The Court agreed with the
22. /d. (quoting 124 CoNG. REc. H32,417 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep.
Edwards)).
23. /d.
24. /d. at 2269 (Scalia, J., concurring). "When I pay a worker $90 there is no clearly identifiable locus of $10 in withheld taxes that I do not pay him. Indeed, if my total assets at the time of
the payment are $90 there is no conceivable locus." /d.
25. /d.
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legislative history that the IRS could recover if it "could demonstrate
the amounts of withheld taxes were still in the debtor's possession at
the time the petition was filed." 26 This statement seems to indicate that
only the abstract "amount" of tax, not the actual physical funds collected, need be in the debtor's possession at the time the bankruptcy
petition is filed. Therefore, if the IRS can show that the assets in the
debtor's possession equal or exceed the amount of taxes due, the IRS
may have met its tracing burden.
This conclusion is further reinforced by the Court's reference to a
section 7501 trust as a different creature than a common law trust. The
Court states:
A § 7501 trust is radically different from the common-law paradigm,
however. That provision states that "the amount of [trust-fund] tax
. . . collected or withheld shall be held to be a special fund in trust
for the United States." Unlike a common-law trust, in the which the
settlor sets aside particular property as the trust res, § 7501 creates a

trust in an abstract "amount" -a dollar figure not tied to any particular assets-rather than in the actual dollars withheld. 27

In essence, the Court is mandating a new type of trust, limited to
trusts created under section 7501. This new type of trust violates the
well-established principle that a trust cannot exist unless identifiable
and separate assets can be shown to create a trust res. 28 Nevertheless,
the Court justifies this result by asserting that "[t]he general commonlaw rule that a trust is not created absent a designation of particular
property obviously does not invalidate section 7 501 's creation of a trust
in the 'amount' of withheld taxes. The common law of trusts is not
binding on Congress." 29 By so stating, the Court apparently finds that
26. /d. at 2266 (quoting 124 CoNG. Rt:c. H32,417) (remarks of Rep. Edwards)).
27. /d. at 2265 (emphasis added).
28. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
29. Begier v. IRS, 110 S. Ct. 2258, 2265 n.4 (1990) (emphasis added). The Court's conclusion may open doors for federal and state legislatures that wish to recast liens on debtor's property
as trusts. If, for instance, states pass environmental laws which establish a trust in the debtor's
property equal to the "amount" of damage caused by hazardous waste pollution on the debtor's
property, such a statute may give the state a position in bankruptcy ahead of other creditors and
administrative expenses. Of course, this assumes that the common law of trusts is also not binding
on state legislatures. Prior to Begier, most courts did not allow states to invent trust tracing rules
that did not provide for identification of the actual corpus of the trust. See, e.g., Torres v. Eastlick
(In re North Am. Coin & Currency, Ltd.), 767 F.2d 1573, 1575 (9th Cir. 1985) (refusing to
apply state constructive trust rules in bankruptcy proceedings); Elliott v. Bumb, 356 F.2d 749, 754
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 829 (1966) (state law which purported to dispense with need to
trace trust assets held inapplicable in bankruptcy). For a look at the states' problems in collecting
environmental cleanup costs from polluters and some of the current statutory mechanisms to enable collection, see Note, Recovering Costs for Cleaning Up Hazardous Waste Sites: An Examination of State Superlien Statutes, 63 IND. L.J. 571 (1988).
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Congress intended to change the common law of trusts for the benefit of
the IRS and that Congress has such power.
Yet, the Court's ruling seems to go further than necessary. The
Court easily could have ruled in favor of the IRS without rewriting
trust law. Because the debtor in this case was the settlor of the trust
and made the tax payments, the Court could have concluded that the
debtor identified the trust by virtue of her payment to the IRS. This
would have drawn a narrow rule and preserved current trust law. 30 In
addition, the Court did not have to rely on overturning Randall to
arrive at its decision. Instead, the Court could have distinguished Begier
on the basis of the voluntary payment-a fact not present in Randall.
However, the Court's reliance on other, broader means to reach its decision implies intent to make Begier broadly applicable to all IRS trust
fund tax cases, including circumstances where no payment is made or
where the payment is made involuntarily.
V.

A.

POSSIBLE REASONS FOR ADOPTING

Begier's

APPROACH

Relief for Responsible Persons

One of the primary purposes for the existence of the Bankruptcy
Code is to give relief and a "fresh start" to honest debtors who encounter difficulty paying debts. However, in certain circumstances, this purpose may be somewhat frustrated by federal laws which allow various
types of debt to be excluded from discharge in bankruptcy. 31
Trust fund taxes, in some cases, are an example of a nondischargeable debt which, if not paid in bankruptcy, will continue to
burden the debtor or debtor's officers with a continuing obligation to
pay the taxes, even after successful completion of a plan of reorganization or liquidation. The Internal Revenue Code provides:
Any person required to collect . . . any tax imposed by this title who
willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for and pay
over such tax . . . shall, in addition to other penalties provided by
law, be liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded
32

Under this provision, any trust fund money which is not collected
30. See, e.g., G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 111 (rev. 2d ed. 1988) (a trust
does not come into existence until the settlor identifies an ascertainable interest in property to be
the trust res).
31. See Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. 2126 (1990) (expressing concern that exceptions to discharge are frustrating the policy of the Bankruptcy Code). But
see Kelley v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
32. 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a) (1990).
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from the estate may be collected from the person(s) responsible for paying over the withheld taxes. If the full tax is not recovered from the
estate, the IRS may still pursue collection of the tax after discharge. 33
Therefore, the debtor or the debtor's agents responsible for trust fund
payments will, if the IRS is not paid in full in bankruptcy, continue to
be burdened with personal liability for trust fund taxes, even after all
other debts have been discharged.
However, if the result in Begier is extended to all trust fund tax
cases, the threat of non-dischargeable trust fund tax liability will decrease. The minimal tracing requirements imposed by Begier will ensure, in many cases, that all IRS trust fund tax claims will be paid in
bankruptcy, leaving no residual obligation after completion of bankruptcy. Thus, persons responsible for making tax payments will not be
further burdened with liability for such debts.
B.

Federal Budget Deficits

One other potential reason for expanding Begier to cover all trust
fund tax obligations in bankruptcy centers on the political events and
fiscal developments currently afoot in the United States. Congress has
found it increasingly difficult to balance federal spending with tax revenues. 34 Budget deficits have become a way of life in Washington. Congress finds it easier to increase spending to benefit constituents but is
uneasy about increasing taxes to match higher spending-probably out
of fear of voter backlash. Therefore, it is politically preferable to collect
additional monies under the current tax structure than to change the
taxing mechanisms, a process that would be subject to much greater
public scrutiny. By allowing the IRS to avoid standing in line behind
administrative expenses and creditors with higher priority status, the
government will be able to collect additional taxes without the corresponding increased visibility of a tax hike. Consequently, Begier's approach is politically expedient.

VI.

UNANSWERED PoTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH

Begier's

FoRMULATION

If the Begier alternative to strict tracing results in bankruptcy
side-stepping for the IRS, there are several potential problems and
questions which will need to be addressed in the future. This note ex33. See United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268 (1978) (holding in a five-to-four decision that
the funds involved in 26 U.S.C. § 6672 were taxes not dischargeable by virtue of II U.S.C. §
507(a)(6)(C), 523(a)(I)(A)).
34. See, e.g., Mitchell, Save the Gramm-Rudman Sequester, HERITAGE FoUND. REP. (Apr.
3, 1990) (suggesting that federal spending and budget deficits continue to grow uncontrollably).

150

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 5

amines a few of these concerns, although there are undoubtedly many
others, in order to point out some difficulties that may lie ahead if the
abstract trust concept is implemented as Regier seems to recommend.

A.

What Is the Scope of "Amount"?-The Priority Problem

Traditionally, secured creditors in bankruptcy have been repaid
out of the collateral which secured their right to payment. However, if,
as Regier suggests, the IRS is entitled to recover its trust fund tax claim
out of the "amounts" in the debtor's possession, without the need to
trace the source of those amounts to the associated trust fund taxes, it
may be possible that secured creditors will have their collateral taken to
pay debtor's trust fund taxes.
For example, assume that debtor, D, has trust fund tax liabilities
of $1 ,000,000 and non-exempt property, Blackacre, valued at
$1,000,000. D has no other exempt assets. However, C, a secured creditor of D, has a valid security interest in Blackacre to secure an obligation of $500,000. D files bankruptcy. Thereafter, the IRS seeks to seize
Blackacre, arguing that the amount of withheld taxes was in D's possession at the commencement of the case in the form of Blackacre.
Therefore, the IRS, if successful, will arguably be entitled to dispose of
Blackacre outside bankruptcy, leaving the estate with no assets from
which to pay the otherwise secured creditor.
Of course, in the situation above, C might argue that because
Blackacre is subject to its lien, D does not have the amount of taxes still
in his possession. Instead, D has only $500,000 in his possession, the
total value of Blackacre less the amount of C's lien. In other words, C
may allege that "amount" refers only to unencumbered assets. Alternatively, C may argue that "amount" refers only to money in D's possession, not to land or personalty which D owns. In any event, the determination of the exact meaning or scope of the word "amount" may
have profound implications for debtor-creditor transactions in the future if Regier is applied to cases involving the non-payment of trust
fund taxes.
A similar problem with the majority opinion in Regier, suggested
by Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion, is illustrated by the following example. 311 Suppose debtor, D, has assets valued at $1,000,000.
However, the IRS has a claim for trust fund taxes equalling
$1,500,000. Does the argument that a trust automatically arises, in a
sum equal to the amount of withheld taxes, apply in this case? The
bankruptcy trustee presumably will argue that because the IRS cannot
35. Begier v. IRS, 110 S. Ct. 2258, 2269 (1990); see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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demonstrate that D has the full amount of trust fund taxes in her possession, the IRS cannot recover anything. The trustee will claim that a
trust could not possibly have arisen in the amount of the withheld taxes
because such sum does not even exist. The IRS will probably argue, in
response, that to the extent that D has some of the amount of the tax in
her possession, the IRS is entitled to that amount ahead of administrative and higher priority claims.
In short, Begier leaves unanswered the potential scope of the word
"amount." If future cases pay heed to the logic underlying the decision,
there will necessarily be much future litigation to decide whether
"amount" means property as well as money and whether the term encompasses all property and money or merely items not covered by valid
security interests. These future cases may also decide whether a trust
can even arise in the amount of the tax if the debtor never had sufficient assets to pay such tax.

B.

Does Begier Promote Equitable Distribution Principles?

If a debtor has trust fund liability which equals the value of her
assets, then arguably, under Begier the IRS may be able to take possession of all the debtor's assets, even after a petition in bankruptcy has
been filed. Under such circumstances, the estate would be left with
nothing to distribute. Administrative expenses would not be paid. Attorneys would not be able to collect their fees. Other priority creditors
would not recover anything. Secured creditors would be left without
collateral. Instead, the IRS would take everything.
Such a result is contrary to the equitable distribution principles
underlying the entire bankruptcy process. 36 Rather, it seems to promote
a policy of inequitable distribution. Instead of dividing the debtor's assets among creditors, Begier may allow the IRS to dispose of most of
the debtor's estate, leaving few assets for other creditors. This exact
criticism led the Court in Randall to conclude that "the statutory policy of subordinating taxes to costs and expenses of administration
would not be served by creating or enforcing trusts which eat up an
estate leaving little or nothing for creditors and court officers . . . ." 37
The Randall criticism of allowing the IRS to extract trust fund
taxes without tracing their source seems even more appropriate in light
of the system of priorities explicitly established in the Bankruptcy
Code. Section 507 specifically provides that taxes are to be paid only
after administrative expenses and five additional types of priority
36. See id. at 2261.
37. United States v. Randall, 401 U.S. 513, 517 (1971).
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claims. 38 By elevating certain taxes above these other claims, the judiciary circumvents the language of the Bankruptcy Code, in direct contradiction of the legislature's intended treatment of such taxes.

C.

Will Section 7512 Lose Its Importance?

Section 7512 allows the IRS to require debtors to establish separate bank accounts for the deposit of trust fund taxes. 39 As previously
noted, the ostensible purpose of this provision may be to prevent commingling of trust fund taxes with debtor's personal assets, thus making
it easier for the IRS to trace the disposition of such taxes. 40 But if
Begier gives the IRS the ability to take any and all assets in the
debtor's possession upon bankruptcy, the provision may become a useless tool. The IRS will not be concerned if there is not strict segregation
of debtor's property and trust fund taxes. After all, if Regier's analysis
holds true, as long as the IRS can show that the debtor has the
"amount" of taxes in her possession, it may win with no other showing.
As a result, the utility of section 7 512 as a tracing aid may be completely lost.

D.

Does Begier Venture into New Uncharted Trust Rules?

If trusts of abstract "amounts" can be created, is Begier a first step
toward a new perception of trust law? If it is, what form will the trust
rules take? Will different trust rules apply depending on whether a
governmental entity or a private concern is the beneficiary of the trust?
Will it become possible to create floating trusts-trusts which have no
identifiable res but merely "float" over unidentified assets-in nonbankruptcy situations? These and other questions are the most difficult
and perhaps the most important issues raised by Begier. The Supreme
Court's simple statement that "the common law of trusts is not binding
on Congress" 41 may be nothing more than a blot of ink in a reporter,
or it may be the beginning of the end for trust law as now practiced.

VII.

CONCLUSION

Begier firmly cements new trust tracing rules to the IRS's benefit.
However, the limits of these rules and their eventual impact is subject
to less concrete suppositions. Nevertheless, the answer to at least one
question is clear from Begier: If a debtor makes a voluntary payment of
38.
39.
40.
41.

11 u.s.c. § 507 (1990).
26 u.s.c. § 7512 (1990).
See supra text accompanying note 7.
Begier v. IRS, 110 S. Ct. 2258, 2265 n.4 (1990).
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trust fund taxes to the IRS prior to bankruptcy, such a transfer is never
subject to avoidance. However, if no transfer is made, or if a transfer is
made involuntarily, courts cannot use Begier to determine the IRS's
entitlement to be paid outside normal bankruptcy distribution channels.
With the above concepts in mind, some statements made in Begier
point to a possible new view of the IRS's right to payment in bankruptcy. Begier may eliminate the need for the IRS to trace withheld
taxes. Instead, in future cases the IRS may be required to show only
that the debtor had sufficient funds to pay the tax at the time of filing
bankruptcy. If this is the end result, Begier may spell relief for persons
responsible for paying trust fund taxes, thus not only assisting the
Treasury in filling the federal government's coffers but also aiding
Congress in balancing the federal budget. However, it may also present
unanswered priority questions in bankruptcy by causing bankruptcy to
shift toward payment of government claims and away from equitable
distribution principles. In addition, Begier may be an experiment which
ultimately changes basic trust rules. With unanswered questions waiting in the wings, Begier may play a leading role in developing new
concepts and practices in modern bankruptcy law, or it simply may
remain off-stage-a faceless member of a forgotten cast of innovative
but impractical cases.
Guy Lamoyne Black

